On the Desirability of Capital Controls (Bachelor thesis)

Κούλα, Ρομίνα


Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorΚούλα, Ρομίναel
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-10T13:15:06Z-
dc.date.available2020-06-10T13:15:06Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://195.251.240.227/jspui/handle/123456789/11986-
dc.descriptionIn a standard two-country international macro model, we ask whether imposing restrictions on international non contingent borrowing and lending is ever desirable. The answer is yes. If one country imposes capital controls unilaterally, it can generate favorable changes in the dynamics of equilibrium interest rates and the terms of trade, and thereby benet at the expense of its trading partner. If both countries simultaneously impose capital controls, the welfare eects are ambiguous. We identify calibrations in which symmetric capital controls improve terms of trade insurance against country-specic shocks and thereby increase welfare for both countries.el
dc.rightsDefault License-
dc.subjectCapital Controlsen
dc.subjectTerms of Tradeen
dc.subjectInternational Risk Sharingen
dc.subjectΈλεγχοι κεφαλαίουel
dc.subjectΌροι εμπορίουel
dc.subjectΔιεθνής κατανομή κινδύνωνel
dc.titleOn the Desirability of Capital Controlsen
heal.typebachelorThesis-
heal.type.enBachelor thesisen
heal.classificationMonetary policyen
heal.classificationCapital movementsen
heal.classificationΝομισματική πολιτικήel
heal.classificationΚινήσεις κεφαλαίωνel
heal.contributorNameΓΚΙΟΥΡΗΣ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣel
heal.identifier.secondary9084-
heal.languageen-
heal.accessaccount-
heal.recordProviderΣχολή Διοίκησης και Οικονομίας / Τμήμα Λογιστικής και Χρηματοοικονομικήςel
heal.publicationDate2017-10-25-
heal.bibliographicCitation<<Κόυλα Ρομίνα>>, <<On the Desirability of Capital Controls>>, <<Σχολή Διοίκησης και Οικονομίας / Τμήμα Λογιστικής και Χρηματοοικονομικής>>, <<Διεθνές Πανεπιστήμιο Ελλάδος>>, <<2017>>el
heal.abstractIn a standard two-country international macro model, we ask whether imposing restrictions on international non contingent borrowing and lending is ever desirable. The answer is yes. If one country imposes capital controls unilaterally, it can generate favorable changes in the dynamics of equilibrium interest rates and the terms of trade, and thereby benet at the expense of its trading partner. If both countries simultaneously impose capital controls, the welfare eects are ambiguous. We identify calibrations in which symmetric capital controls improve terms of trade insurance against country-specic shocks and thereby increase welfare for both countries.-
heal.tableOfContentsContents Page 1 Introduction ……………………………………………….....2 1.1 Related Literature……………………………....................................….4 2 The Model……………………………………………………6 2.1 Preferences and Technologies…………………………………………..6 2.2 Firm Problems……………………………………….……………….…8 2.3 International Relative Prices……………………………………………9 2.4 Asset Markets and Capital Controls……………………………………9 2.5 Household Problems and Definition of Equilibrium…………………..12 3 Calibration………………………………………………….13 3.1 Computation………………………………………………………...…14 4 Results………………………………………………………..15 4.1 Unilateral Capital Controls………………………………………….…16 4.1.1 Sensitivity……………………………………………………………….…..20 4.1.2 Conditional Capital Controls………………………………………..………22 4.1.3 Interest Rates versus Exchange Rates……………………………………….25 4.1.4 Alternative Model for Taxes………………………………….………..……27 4.2 Capital Control Wars…………………………………….……….……28 4.3 Pareto-Improving Capital Controls……………………………….…...30 5 Conclusion…………………………………………………...33 References....................................................................................................34en
heal.advisorNameΓΚΙΟΥΡΗΣ , ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣel
heal.committeeMemberNameΓΚΙΟΥΡΗΣ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣel
heal.academicPublisherΣχολή Διοίκησης και Οικονομίας / Τμήμα Λογιστικής και Χρηματοοικονομικήςel
heal.academicPublisherIDihu-
heal.fullTextAvailabilityfalse-
heal.type.elΠροπτυχιακή/Διπλωματική εργασίαel
Appears in Collections:Πτυχιακές Εργασίες

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.



 Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://195.251.240.227/jspui/handle/123456789/11986
  This item is a favorite for 0 people.

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.